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Measuring the Impacts of Wolves on the “Market” for Elk Hunting: 
Hunter Adjustment and Game Agency Response 
 
I.  Introduction. 
Some hunters, outfitters and politicians have blamed wolves for declining elk 
numbers. Park scientists maintain there are a variety of factors, like drought and 
other predators, at play…(McMillion 2003, “Elk...It’s what’s for Dinner”) 
 
The reintroduction of the gray wolf to Montana and other western states has to date 
largely pitted ranchers against environmental groups, with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) as the central agency for this reintroduction.
1  There is also another 
group affected by wolves that to date have had little influence on this reintroduction.  
Hunters and outfitters have diverse views on wolves, and accordingly have not spoken 
with one voice concerning their reintroduction.
2  This lack of a common view is mirrored 
by the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation’s (one of the largest hunting groups in North 
America) evolving policy statements in 1995 and 2003 that specifically addresses that 
their membership will take different sides to wolf reintroduction, and that the group 
supports state control of wolves, “ultimately achieving an appropriate balance between 
wildlife, habitat, and people” (Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation, 2005).   
Part of the ambivalence of hunters towards wolves stems from the general lack of 
published knowledge regarding the actual impacts of wolves on game populations, game 
behavior, and ultimately hunters’ satisfaction.  This lack of knowledge arises due to the 
                                                 
1 The USFWS is in the process of passing management of wolves to Montana and Idaho.  Wolves are still 
listed as threatened under the Endangerd Species Act (Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 2005).  This 
agency transfer was made after Montana’s and Idaho’s wolf management plan were accepted by the 
USFWS.  Wyoming’s plan has not been accepted, and wolves remain under federal control there. 
2 The wide range of hunter attitudes toward wolves are evident in popular hunting 
magazines such as Field and Stream (McCafferty; McIntyre) and Outdoor Life (Zumbo).   
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complex nature of the predator/prey relationships, the extensive movements of wolves 
and their prey, and the difficulty of obtaining good population estimates of both wolves 
and particularly their prey.  Additionally from an economic perspective, hunters’ property 
rights to game are ill-defined, with the political strength of hunting “rights” and their 
values quite difficult to determine. 
This paper provides estimates of the effects of wolves on hunter opportunities, 
where these opportunities are influenced by actions taken by both the game agency and 
hunters in response to the spread of wolves.  We utilize permit availability, hunter 
success, and measures of hunter competition as published by Montana Fish, Wildlife and 
Parks (MFWP) to assess the impacts of wolves on hunters. We focus on elk − a game 
species that is both vulnerable to wolves and that is in high demand in Montana.   
  Our estimation approach draws from a hedonic model in which hunters compete 
for a rivalrous good (an elk hunting opportunity) that is not allocated through a price 
mechanism.  Hunters in most western states compete for hunting rights by entering a 
special permit lottery in some cases, while they compete in other cases by undertaking 
costly activities to obtain a right under open access.  Hunters compete for these rights 
under open access by racing to reach hunting areas early, establishing expertise and 
customary areas, and in other ways consistent with Barzel (1974).  Both types of 
competition are observable as in Nickerson (1990), by Buschena, Anderson, and Leonard 
(2001), and by Scrogin, Berrens, and Bohara (2000).  Hunters are modeled empirically so 
that they can benefit from elk and also from experience value of wolves. 
    The paper provides not only a study of agency decisions in response to impacts of 
a threatened species, but also applies a relatively little-studied method of determining   4
factors of demand and agency decision for goods distributed via a non-price mechanism.  
Our application (1) uses observable measures of hunter competition that reflect good 
valuation, (2) statistically accounts for the endogeneity of hunter and agency decision, 
and (3) models the simultaneous equilibria across numerous and diverse hunting districts 
(the “goods” being competed for in this case).   
  Our empirical estimation shows that as wolf populations in a particularly high 
profile region outside Yellowstone National Park become established in a hunting 
district, (1) the state game agency reduces the supply of special hunting permits, (2) there 
is lower demand for hunting in that district under special permit licenses, and (3) hunter 
success rates for both special permits and open access decline with increased wolf 
pressure.  We find that the game agency and hunters respond as hypothesized to reduced 
hunting opportunities, and that their responses are larger in magnitude for wolf 
populations with high political profiles.   
To presage our results, key statistics from Montana Elk Hunting Districts 313 and 
314 adjacent to Yellowstone National Park are illustrated in Figure 1.  Readers are 
encouraged to compare these data with averages for selected periods reported in White et 
alia. Since the reintroduction of wolves and their rapid increase in the Greater 
Yellowstone area, special cow elk permit numbers have dropped from 2,870 permits in 
1996 to 100 in 2005 and zero permits in 2006 (MFWP Big-Game Hunting Regulations, 
various years).  Hunter harvest for these permits has declined by 50% from over 1000 in 
year 2000 to less than 500 in 2003.  Because there were additional factors such as 
drought that may have influenced elk population, state and federal biologists have been 
reluctant to attribute these declines to wolves (see the diverse opinions in McMillion,   5
2005 and also Smith, 2005).  Our analysis will statistically determine the effects of 
wolves on elk hunting opportunities and success rates in these and other hunting districts 
in Montana, accounting for other factors such as weather. 
 
 
































Sources: Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Annual Reports (various years), the 
Yellowstone Wolf Project (various years), and Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks. 
 
 
II. Wolf Predation Patterns and Wolf Reintroduction in the Rocky Mountain West. 
Wolves and others species found protection in the U.S. with the passage of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973. Wolves began re-migrating from Canada into 
the Glacier National Park area during the 1980s, with six packs inhabiting the area by 
1995 (USFWS 2002, 2003).  In addition to this naturally occurring reintroduction, the 
federal government transplanted sixty-six wolves from southwestern Canada into 
Yellowstone National Park and Central Idaho throughout the mid-1990s under the 
Northern Rocky Mountain Recovery Area (NRMRA) wolf restoration plan.  Wolves are 
known to disperse over wide ranges, thus allowing the population to spread fairly quickly   6
(MFWP Final EIS, 2003).  By the end of 2003, an estimated 761 wolves inhabited the 
NRMRA; there were an estimated 1300 wolves in 2006 (USFWS; 2003, 2004, 2007).  
The criteria established by the USFWS for a recovered wolf population in the NRMRA 
were met in 2002 (USFWS, 2007), although wolves have not yet been delisted.  The 
wolves transplanted into Yellowstone National Park have been particularly fecund, have 
garnered considerable attention, and have dispersed widely outside the park’s borders.  
The wolf is a very effective predator, with high rates of kill (Mech and Peterson, 
2003; Mader, 2004).  Estimating the wolf’s impacts on big-game herds in the NRMRA is 
difficult, particularly for estimates over large and heterogeneous areas. The initial 
Environmental Impact Statement produced by the USFWS was released in May of 1994 
prior to the reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park. In the report, the 
USFWS stated that a population of 100 wolves in the Yellowstone area would reduce elk 
populations by 5 percent to 20 percent, mule deer by 10 percent, bison by 5 percent to10 
percent, and leave other big-game species populations unaffected (USFWS, 1994). 
Scientists from the University of Wyoming alternatively estimated reductions in elk 
populations from 15 percent to 25 percent, while a separate panel estimated reductions in 
moose populations by 10 percent to 15 percent and mule deer populations by 20 percent 
to 30 percent (United States National Park Service, 2003). 
Population Surveys.  Although widely viewed as inaccurate, elk population data 
from surveys conducted by MFWP points to some potential wolf predation effects.
3 The 
long-term average elk population for the northern Yellowstone herd from 1968 to 2002 
                                                 
3 Annual counts of the northern Yellowstone herd can fluctuate up to 30 percent to 40 
percent, with average annual fluctuations of 10 percent to 20 percent.   
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was 13,846 elk. However, counts from recent years show this number declining quickly. 
In 2001, there was a count of 11,969 elk in the herd. In 2002, the count was 9,215 elk 
(MFWP Final EIS 2003).  There has also been a decline in calf recruitment, measured by 
the number of calves (young) per 100 cow elk (mature females). 
Biologists have concluded that elk populations in the Greater Yellowstone Area 
(GYA) of Montana have decreased, but that numerous factors have contributed to the 
decline of the northern Yellowstone elk herd. Some of these factors are predation, 
population effects of the drought, winterkill due to snow deep snow pack, as well as 
hunting, but the importance of these multiple factors have not been quantitatively 
assessed (MFWP Final EIS 2003).  
The Yellowstone Wolf Project (Smith, Stahler, and Guernsey 2003) and work by 
Creel and Winnie (2004) provide very specific evidence of the effects of wolf predation 
on relatively small study areas.  Combined studies from 1995 to 2002  showed that the 
composition of wolf-killed elk in the Northern Range of the greater Yellowstone area was 
comprised of 39 percent calves, 11 percent cows ages 1 to 9 years old, 29 percent cows of 
ages over 10 years, and 21 percent bulls.  Wolves in the GYA area of Montana, like those 
in Alaska and Canada, are opportunistic, preying on young elk, old elk, and interestingly 
bull elk in their prime breeding and reproductive lives.  
Not all areas of the NRMRA exhibit the same big-game population structure as 
that of the GYA. Northwest Montana, for example, has a significantly different big-game 
population than southwest Montana does, with deer comprising most the primary big-
game species in Northwest Montana.  In the these districts the wolf’s diet consists of 83 
percent white-tailed deer, 14 percent elk, and 3 percent moose (MFWP Final EIS 2003,   8
22). These prey composition differences mean that our evaluation of the impacts of 
wolves on elk hunting in the NWMRA may be quite different for that of the populations 
in the GYA.  
An additional factor accounted for in our estimations, and that amplifies the effect 
of wolf predation on big-game populations is the presence of other large predators such 
as bears (grizzly and black) and mountain lions in wolf-inhabited areas.  Both species of 
bears may prey on ungulate calves in the spring and male ungulates weakened from the 
fall rut (Griztrax.net 2004; Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2004). In addition, 
bears scavenge ungulate carcasses when available, often displacing feeding wolves from 
ungulate carcasses and thus reducing the amount of meat a kill might provide to a wolf 
pack.  Human hunting pressure can likewise influence the impacts that wolves have on 
elk, and vice versa. 
 
III. Hunter Equilibrium Under Non-Price Allocation Methods 
The Market for Limited Hunting Permits 
In many western states the “market” for hunting permits does not reach 
equilibrium using prices.  The quantity of permits is set administratively by the state 
game agency.  The agency also defines the dimensions in which hunters can compete for 
hunting opportunities.  The demand for a hunting permit is constructed as a function of 
the prices associated with obtaining the permit (p), its characteristics (c), and the 
regulations affecting the permit (r):   
(1) D(p, c, r).    9
Consider demand D
0 in Figure 2. The supply of permits is set by the game agency 
based on area biological studies, as well as constituency pressure from hunters. The 
supply is represented by a vertical line, and is fixed at the pre-announced quota level. If 
the price was allowed to adjust to clear the market, the quota level Q1 would give rise to a 
price of P1. 
 
Figure 2. Market supply and demand for hunting permit j. 
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However, rather than adjusting, the price a hunter pays for a permit is fixed at 
price P0 in Figure 2.  This price is typically uniform over permits for the same species.  
At this fixed price a shortage exists and is equal to the difference between the fixed 
quantity supplied, Q1, and the quantity demanded at that price, Q2. From Barzel (1974) 
we know that the market will clear by consumers competing, perhaps by queuing,   10
resulting in a total price of P1.  This total price is comprised of  P0 paid in monetary units, 
and P1 minus P0 being paid in queuing or other costs.  
Two other types of equilibria might be observed in this market. If the quota level 
were fortuitously set at Q2, a fixed price of P0 would lead to the market reaching 
equilibrium in prices. If the quota level were instead set at Q3, a fixed price of P0 would 
give rise to a surplus of Q3 minus Q2 and the market reaches equilibrium at Q2. This 
surplus equilibrium occurs for some elk permits in several states. 
Market Clearing under a Random Lottery 
Most special hunting permits are allocated by lottery in western states.  Nickerson 
(1990) analyzed Washington State’s lottery system and estimated factors affecting the 
demand for hunting.  Nickerson’s model allows inference of the value of a given hunting 
permit to the marginal hunter using the number of applicants for a permit and the number 
of permits issued by the game agency.  Nickerson’s key insight is, ceteris paribus, 
because more hunters enter permits for desirable hunts, the odds ratios of drawing a hunt 
permit reflects its demand.     
The value of permit j, Vj, is a function of permit characteristics (xj) and the permit 
regulations (rj). Let the fixed supply of the permit be Qj, and the number of entrants in the 
lottery for the permit be Nj. Therefore, Qj/Nj represents a lottery entrant’s likelihood of 
being drawn and receiving permit j. There is a non-refundable fee associated with the 
lottery for any permit, PL.  Hunters can only enter the drawing lottery for one permit per 
year; i.e., they must select the lottery in which to place their single entry.
4  
                                                 
4 There are in some states methods that allow a hunter to build up “points” over time that increase their 
drawing odds.  Such a system in Colorado was analyzed in Buschena, Anderson and Leonard.  Montana did 
not have such a system during the years we evaluate here.   11
The expected value of entering the lottery for permit j, λj, can be written as the 
sum of the values of its outcomes weighted by their likelihoods:   
(2)  λj  =  (Qj/Nj)*(Vj – PL) - [1-(Qj/Nj)]*(PL)  
     = (Qj/Nj)*(Vj) – PL. 
An individual will choose to enter a lottery as long as λj >0, and the expected value of 
entering the lottery for permit j is greater than the expected value of entering the lottery 
for any other permit.  The equilibrium values for each permit, and their odds, will depend 
on each permit’s price, pj, characteristics, xj, and the regulations for each permit rj.  In 
equilibrium, the marginal hunter will equate the expected value of entering a lottery for 
permits i and j.  If these two permits have the same values, their drawing odds are 
predicted to be equal: 
(3)  λ(pi, xi, ri) = λ(pj, cj, rj) 
   
“Market Clearing” Under Open Access 
General license holders in Montana have numerous districts in which to hunt elk 
at zero marginal monetary costs once the license has been purchased (ignoring travel, 
time and other costs).
5  Hunting in these open access areas without a special permit is the 
norm, and the typical problems of overcrowding and overuse result.  There is an 
interesting equilibrium under this open access for which hunters weigh the characteristics 
of hunting in one area vs. another (or they may alternatively forego hunting), and the 
marginal hunter in a district defines the equilibrium.  The marginal hunter indifferent 
between open access districts i and j has the following equality in net values: 
(4) V (pi, xi, ri) = V (pj, xj, rj). 
                                                 
5 General license fees are quite small.  Montana’s elk license fee was $16 in 2003 and $20 in 2006.   12
The Effects of Wolves on the Non-Price Equilibrium 
  Wolves can change the hunt characteristics by reducing prey species and also may 
change the value of the hunt beyond their effect on prey.  Wolves in district i but not 
district j may therefore change the decision of the marginal hunter under either the permit 
lottery (Equation 3) or the open access system (Equation 4).  If wolves have a negative 
(positive) net effect on the marginal hunter’s value fewer (more) hunters will apply for 
that permit and fewer hunters will enter the district under open access.  We will consider 
the impacts on both equilibria in our empirical estimations. 
Predicted Effects of Wolves on Game Agency Behavior   
Batastini (2005) models the response by the game agency to wolf pressure on elk.  
This two-period model considers support for the game agency for both hunter and general 
recreational users.  The comparative statics results of this constrained optimization model 
are complex and can not be theoretically be signed.  Considerations of anticipated signs 
and magnitudes provide a few hypotheses that we test here. 
Permit numbers in the district with newly existent wolves, district j, will likely 
decrease with wolf numbers if: (a) total hunter net present value from hunting in that 
district decreases with wolves; (b) hunter and general user value decreases with 
additional hunting permits; (c) the second order effect of wolves on the effects of  permits 
in (b) are negative;  (d) the marginal value of elk in period t+1 is positive for both hunters 
and general users, and this marginal value decreases with wolves; (e) cross-district effects 
on marginal values are relatively small;  and (6) both additional wolves and additional 
hunters (permits) decrease elk numbers in period t+1, both at a decreasing rate.   13
  There are no signs reasonably obtainable for the impacts of wolves in district j on 
the agency’s decision to set permits in the district without wolves, district i.  A critical 
empirical issue is that appropriate measurement of “wolf pressure” presents an interesting 
empirical challenge as biologists (e.g., Creel and Winnie) have found wolf effects to have 
complicated temporal patterns.  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Model 
We use three categories of data for our empirical tests.  The dependent variables provide 
measures of hunting opportunity quality, quantity, and demand.  The set of explanatory 
variables of primary interest measure current and longer-term wolf pressure.  A set of 
supportive secondary explanatory variables account for additional factors affecting 
hunting quality, quantity and demand, but are unrelated to wolf pressure.  Observations 
are by administratively defined hunting districts. 
  Dependent Variables.  Our dependent variables of hunt quality and permit 
quantity are defined as annual percentage changes during the period 1999-2003, while 
demand is observed for a single year (2003).  The use of percentage changes for a 
particular district allows us to abstract from land access, travel cost, and unobserved 
variables while focusing on the critical effects of wolves.  The available wolf data and 
lack of very good annual hunter demographic data combined to lead us to estimate hunter 
demand for a single year.
6    All of the dependent variables are provided in MFWP’s 
Hunting and Harvest Reports, an annual publication that reports permit numbers, hunter 
                                                 
6 We also carried out a hunter demand regression for 2000 using the same set of explanatory variables and 
found qualitatively the same results as for 2003.   14
success (from extensive surveys of hunters), and the number of applicants for lotteries 
allowing special permit hunts. 
MFWP’s Hunting and Harvest reports are released annually, but the reports from 
the license years 1996 through 1998 have not been released.  These years are rather 
important as they are the years just after the release of wolves into Yellowstone National 
Park and provide a pre-wolf snapshot for most districts. We use the annual hunting and 
harvest data from the license years 1999 through 2003 in our analysis.  
  Hunt quality is measured by the percentage change in annual hunter success rates 
for both special permits and hunters using a (open-access) general license.  If MFWP 
adjusts incompletely to (overcompensates for) predation by wolves by not reducing 
permit numbers enough given predation (reducing them too much), then special permit 
success rates are predicted to decline (increase).  If (1) hunters under general licenses 
adjust incompletely to wolves given predation pressure (too many hunters continue to 
hunt in areas with wolves), or (2) if hunters place high experience value on hunting in 
areas with wolves, harvest rates could decline as wolf pressure in a district increases.   
Hunt quantity is measured by the number of hunting permits determined prior to 
the season by the state game agency, MTFWP. 
Demand for special permits is measured by the number of applicants for the 
lottery divided by the number of permits available, the drawing odds.  In the event that 
there are net positive experience effects of hunting in areas with wolves, wolf pressure is 
predicted to increase hunter demand after hunting success rates are accounted for.   15
The special permits were split into cow-only tags and either-sex tags that allowed 
hunters to hunt either cow or bull elk.
7  Most cow hunts are held in the late season, while 
the either-sex tags apply during the regular season (Oct.-Nov.).   The late season cow 
permit numbers in the districts north of Yellowstone National Park are perceived as being 
particularly impacted by wolf pressure.   
Primary Explanatory Variables: Wolf Predation Pressure 
  Wolf pressure was measured by a set of four variables intended to capture both 
the immediate and cumulative effects of wolves on elk and hunters.  Because these four 
variables are necessarily closely related, we will test their joint significance for all three 
regressions rather than to rely on test of significance for the variables singly. 
  Some wolves inhabit a single district, with others inhabit multiple districts.  
Wolves in multiple districts typically follow seasonally migrating elk herds such as those 
in or near Yellowstone National Park.  We used two indicators for the presence of 
wolves, one for single-district and the other for multiple-district packs.  These separate 
indicators allow us to distinguish between wide-ranging wolves and those with more 
limited distributions. 
The five-year average wolf population within a district measures longer-term  
predation effects and is the third wolf variable.  Finally, the difference between the 
current number of wolves and the five year average indicates recent increases in wolf 
numbers.     
                                                 
7 We were unsuccessful in defining a model that pooled these two types of 
permits using intercept and wof/permit type interaction terms.   16
Wolf pack data for Montana is reported by the USFWS in their Northern Rocky 
Mountain Wolf Recovery annual reports.  Addition data for wolves in the GYA are 
provided in the Yellowstone Wolf Project’s Annual Reports (Smith and Stahler). Wolf 
pack size and distributions in Northwest Montana for 1998 were estimated using the 
USFWS reports available for these populations in 1996 and 1999 after consultation with 
Ed Bangs (October 2004), the lead wolf biologist with the USFWS.  
Wolf pack sizes and distributions were combined with hunting district maps to 
determine which districts were inhabited by wolves each year. Because as discussed 
earlier wolf packs and their prey differ among various regions in Montana, the four wolf 
variables will be split for districts in (1) Southwestern Montana, (2) Northcentral 
Montana, and (3) Northwestern Montana. 
Additional Explanatory Variables: Permit Restrictions.   
Indicator variables (taking the value 1 if true, 0 otherwise) will control for a 
particular type of special permit for elk, particularly important for the hunter demand 
regression.  All of the data needed to define these variables is from MFWP’s Hunting and 
Harvest Reports.  An A7 license is a special permit for cow elk hunting that reduces other 
hunting opportunities for elk, and is thus less valuable to hunters, ceteris paribus.  A 
multi-district indicator defines a permit that allows hunting in more than one district.  
Early and late season indicator variables define generally desirable hunts for periods 
outside the regular hunting season.  Youth hunts, archery only hunts, a restricted type of 
either sex hunt, and brow-tined bull only indicators control for hunting restrictions that 
reduce the value of special permits, ceteris paribus. 
Additional Explanatory Variables: Weather Variables.   17
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides annual 
summaries of climatological data for all weather stations in the United States, including 
the monthly precipitation and average monthly temperatures for all Montana weather 
stations (NOAA, Climatological Data Annual Summary, various years). The most 
proximate weather station was selected for each hunting district.  The precipitation and 
temperature data measures we selected are expected to affect elk populations and hunting 
success rates.  Precipitation variables included inches of moisture during the January-
March period (and its square), the April-August precipitation level, the difference (from 
the previous year) in September precipitation, the difference in October precipitation, the 
difference in November precipitation, and for late season hunts the difference in 
December precipitation.  Temperature variables included the average temperature from 
January to March, the change in the September temperature (from the previous year), the 
change in the October temperature, the change in the November temperature, and for late 
season hunts the change in the December temperature.  January-March weather data 
accounts for winter conditions during the most stressful period for elk survival.  April-
August precipitation accounts for summer forage critical for calf survival.  Differences 
from the previous year in precipitation and temperature account for the important effects 
of weather on hunting success in areas of varied elevation and terrain. 
  Additional Explanatory Variables Considered: Pressure by Other Predators. 
Mountain lions, grizzly bears, and black bears all prey on elk.  Bears, particularly 
grizzlies, prey on elk calves in the spring.  Only black bears have a useful published 
measure (lagged harvest rates for bears) that changes much annually.  This lagged black   18
bear harvest level did not add any explanatory power to the regression estimates in 
preliminary runs and was therefore excluded from the estimation. 
 
V.  Estimation Procedures and Results. 
  Three-stage least squares procedures with White’s heteroscedasticity correction 
were used to estimate a system of two equations for the special permits for cow elk and 
for the either sex permits.
8  The two dependent variables in these systems were the 
percent change in hunter harvest rates and the percentage change in the number of 
permits issued.  Hunter harvest was measured for both special permits (cow permits and 
either sex/bull permits) and general license harvest.  A separate instrumental variables 
regression was run for special permit demand (lottery applications) for 2003.   A White 
corrected GLS model was also estimated for the change in hunter harvest rates for 
general elk licenses.  Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. 
A. Percentage Change in Hunter Harvest. 
The results for the percentage change in hunter harvest are given in Table 2.  We focus 
our discussion on the joint effects of the wolf variables.  The weather variables were 
jointly significant at their means, and increases in permits issue significantly decrease 
success rates.  Results for the group of variables measuring the effects of wolves are 
presented by geographic area. 
  Southwestern Montana.  The set of wolf variables were jointly significant at 5% 
level with a negative effect for the success rates for cow permits at the means in this area.  
                                                 
8 Preliminary (OLS) runs revealed some heteroscedastic error problems, but not 
statisically related to the explanatory variables.   
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These wolf variables were not jointly significant for the number of either-sex permits or 
for general hunter success at the means.  These results are consistent with a model were 
the agency reduces (cow) permits due to wolf pressure, some general license hunters 
avoid districts with wolves and thus equilibrate the success rates across regions with and 
without wolves.  The number of hunters was instrumented for the success rates for 
general license holders in a GLS regression.  
  Central Montana.  The set of wolf variables was not jointly significant at the 5% 
level for either the percentage change in hunter success rates for hunters with cow 
permits, or for success rates for general license holders.   
Northwestern Montana.  The set of wolf variables was jointly positive and 
significant at the means for the change in hunter harvest rates for cow permits in 
Northwest Montana at less than 1 percent.  Recall that elk are not the primary prey 
species of wolves and the number of cow permits is quite small in this area.  There were 
no significant joint effects of wolves on general hunter success in this district. 
B. Percentage Change in Permits Issued. 
The estimated joint effects of wolves on permits issued in Table 3 indicate that MTFWP 
significantly (p-value .016) decreased cow elk permit numbers in response to wolves for 
the high profile and high growth wolf packs in Southwest Montana.  These significant 
effects occurred after measures for weather was accounted for.  We found no significant 
effects of wolves on elk permits in either Northwest Montana, or in Central Montana. 
The increase in wolf pressure as measured by the set of Southwest Montana wolf 
variables resulted in a cumulative estimated decrease of xxx permits in the number of 
cow permits at the means from 1999 to 2003.  There was also a significant decrease in the   20
percentage change in either-sex elk permits in Southwest Montana due to the wolf 
variables (p-value less than 1%).   
  There were no significant joint effects of the wolf variables on the percentage 
change in the number of cow permits in Central or in Northwest Montana.  Note also that 
the hunter success rates (Table 2) in these areas also did not show significant negative 
effects from wolves.  Wolf pressure in these areas has been lower than in the Southwest 
Montana area, particularly in hunting districts adjacent to Yellowstone National Park.  As 
previously discussed the prey composition of wolves in these districts also differs. 
 
C. Special Permit Hunter Demand 
The statistical estimates for the effects of wolves and other variables on the number of 
first choice applicants on hunter demand for special permits are given in Table 4 for cow 
permits and either-sex permits for 2003.  These regressions were run using White’s 
heteroscedasticity-corrected GLS model.     
  Southwest Montana.  Wolves statistically significantly (1% level) reduced hunter 
demand for special permits at the means for cow and either sex permits by a cumulative 
xxxx permits in Southwest Montana during the period studied.  Applications were 
reduced by xx% for cow permits (a decline of xxxx permits) and increased xxx% for 
either-sex tags (an increase of xxx permits).  Recall that most cow permits are late season 
hunts, many for areas adjacent to Yellowstone National Park, while the either sex permits 
are generally held during the regular season for resident elk.   
  Central and Northwest Montana.  The set of wolf variables significantly (less 
than the 1% level) increased permit applications per permits issued for cow permits in   21
Central (a 16% increase in applicants) and Northwest Montana (a 32% increase in 
applicants).   
V. Conclusions and Caveats. 
This analysis utilizes observable measures of game agency response, hunter 
demand and hunter success to measure how an agency and recreational users adjust their 
behavior in the presence of a new factor impacting the resource.  Although the subject of 
our analysis is a resource that is not allocated via a pricing mechanism, we are able to 
identify and empirically evaluation changes in value by careful consideration of the ways 
in which agents compete for the scarce rivalrous open-access good.  The theoretical basis 
for this empirical evaluation lies with Barzel’s (1974), with related applications by 
Nickerson (1990), Buschena, Anderson, and Leonard (2001), and Scrogin, Berrens, and 
Bohara (2000). 
  We find quite significant negative effects of reintroduced wolves on hunting 
permits offered by the agency, hunter success, and special permit demand.  These 
reintroduced wolves were transported into Yellowstone National Park in the mid-1990’s 
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and have subsequently established vibrant packs 
outside of the Park.  Interestingly, we do not find similar significant negative effects of 
“naturally” occurring wolves in other hunting areas; wolves in these other areas have 
established packs on their own without a capture and transport program. 
  Our empirical analysis attempts to correct for other factors, such as weather and 
predation by other animals, on the impacts of wolves on elk hunting.  Although we have 
established some arguably useful weather proxies, proxies for predators other than 
wolves are quite difficult to establish.  The time-series and cross section characteristics of   22
our data should to some extent mitigate the unobserved predator effects in the event that 
predation by other species can be viewed as a roughly consistent levels effect. 
  Data availability limited our analysis.  The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, 
and Parks have not released hunting reports for critical years 1996-1998, the years just 
before the reintroduced years were emerging from Yellowstone National Park.  
Additionally, at the time of the analysis 2003 was the most recent year of data; future 
efforts will extend the years analyzed as the data becomes available.   
      
 
   23
REFERENCES 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game. “Overview of Relationships Between Bears, 
Wolves, and Moose in Alaska.” Retrieved on 19 April 2004, from http://wildlife. 
alaska.gov/management/planning/mcgrath/pred_prey.cfm. 
 
Bangs, Edward E.  Project Leader, Gray Wolf Recovery. Phone Conversation.  October, 
2004.   
 
Barzel, Yoram.  “A Theory of Rationing by Waiting.”  Journal of Law and Economics  
17 (1974): 73-96. 
  
Barzel, Yoram. Economic Analysis of Property Rights: Second Edition. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Batastini, John W.  The Impact of Wolves on the “Market” for Elk Hunting in Montana: 
Hunter Adjustment and Game Agency Response.”  Masters Thesis.  Department 
of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University.  2005. 
 
Buschena, D.E., T. Anderson, and J Leonard.  “Valuing Non-Market Goods: The Case of 
Elk Hunting in Colorado and Montana.”  Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management  41 (2001): 33-43. 
 
Creel, Scott and John A. Winnie Jr. “Responses of Elk Herd Size to Fine-Scale Spatial 
and Temporal Variation in the Risk of Predation by Wolves.” Publication of 
Montana State University, Department of Ecology, 2004. 
 
Mader, T.R. (1991). “Wolves and Hunting.” Abundant Wildlife Society of North 
America. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from http://www.natureswolves.com/big-
game/wolves_and_hunting.htm. 
 
McCafferty, K.  Night of the Wolf.”  Field and Stream.  November 25, 2000. 
 
McIntyre, T.  “Return of the Wolf.”  Field and Stream.  June 15, 2005.   
 
McMillion, Scott.  “’Meat Factory’ No More.”  ).  Bugle, the Journal of the Rocky 
Mountain Elk Foundation.  July/August, 2005.  pp 84-89. 
 
Mech, David L. and Rolf O. Peterson. “Wolf-Prey Relationships.” Wolves: Behavior, 
Ecology, and Conservation. Eds. L. David Mech and Luigi Boitani. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003.  
 
Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks.  “FWP Takes Lead in Wolf Management in Montana.” 
http://fwp.state.mt.us/news/article_3700.aspx.  June 24, 2005. 
   24
Nickerson, Peter H. (1990) “Demand for the Regulation of Recreation: The Case of Elk 
and Deer Hunting in Washington State.” Land Economics, 66, 437-447. 
 
Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation.  “Our Positions” (official position statements on 
wolves).  Bugle, the Journal of the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation.  July/August, 
2005.  pp 78. 
 
Scrogin, David, Robert P. Berrens, and Alok. K. Bohara. (2000). “Policy Changes and 
the Demand for Lottery-Rationad Big Game Hunting Licenses.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 25(2): 501-519. 
 
Smith, D.W.  “Ten Years of Yellowstone Wolves.”  Yellowstone Science.  13 (2005):7-
33. 
 
Smith, D.W., D.R. Stahler, and D.S. Guernsey. 2003. Yellowstone Wolf Project: Annual 
Report, 2002. National Park Service, Yellowstone Center for Resources, 
Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming, YCR-NR-2003-04. 
 
United States National Park Service. “Wolf Restoration to Yellowstone.” Retrieved 18 
April 2003, from http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/animals/wolf/wolfrest.html. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 1994. Montana Interagency Wolf Working Group 1994 
Annual Report. USFWS, Ecological Services, 100 N. Park, Suite 320, Helena, 
MT. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA 
Wildlife Services. 2003. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2002 Annual Report. T. 
Meier, ed. USFWS, Ecological Services, 100 N Park, Suite 320, Helena MT. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA 
Wildlife Services. 2004. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2003 Annual Report. T. 
Meier, ed. USFWS, Ecological Services, 100 N Park, Suite 320, Helena MT. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Nez Perce Tribe, National Park Service, and USDA 
Wildlife Services. 2007. Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery 2006 Annual Report. 
C.A. Sime and E.E. Bangs, ed. USFWS, Ecological Services, 525 Shepard Way, 
Helena MT.  59601.  235pp.       
 
White, P.J., D. W. Smith, J.W. Duffield, M. Jimenez, T. McEneaney, and G. Plumb.  
“Wolf EIS Predictions and Ten-Year Appraisals.” Yellowstone Science 13(2005):34-41 
 
Zumbo, J.  “A Howling in the West.” Outdoor Life Dec. 2003: 70-74. 
 
 
   25





   26
Table 2: Percentage Change in Hunter Harvest  










Northwest Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.000  #  0.93 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  1769.93* 
(806.81) 
#  0.87 
(13.19) 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  402.21* 
(201.32) 
#  1.05 
(5.18) 
Five Year Average Wolf Population  -77.01** 
(18.45) 
#  0.63 
(0.76) 
Difference from Five Year Average Wolf Population  8.33 
(25.75) 
#  0.35 
(1.40) 
Central Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.135  #  0.42 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  74.22 
(471.56) 
#  15.46 
(11.36) 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  -213.01 
(285.86) 
#  9.28 
(11.08) 
Five Year Average Wolf Population  -33.29* 
(16.73) 
#  -0.40 
(1.60) 
Difference from Five Year Average Wolf Population  -80.86 
(55.85) 
#  -3.80 
(2.31) 
Southwest Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.05  0.25  0.88 


























Other Model Variables 






























Change in September Precipitation  1.63 
(3.46)  # 
-0.07 
(0.06) 












Change in December Precipitation   1.33 
(1.79) 
0.52* 
(0.23)  # 

















Change in December Temperature   -0.53 
(2.39) 
-0.07 
(0.15)  # 
Observations 518  327  492   28
 
Notes: The continuous wolf variables and the Change in Permits Issued variable is 
divided by the lagged number of elk harvested. * Denotes significance at the 5% 
confidence level. **Denotes significance at the 1% confidence level.  # Denotes a lack of  
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Table 3: Percentage Change in the Number of Permits Issued  
Variable  Cow 
Permits  ES/Bull Permits 
Northwest Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.30  # 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  2094.27 
(1255.66)  # 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  193.09 
(234.61)  # 
Normalized Five Year Average Wolf Population  -19.38 
(18.97)  # 
Normalized Difference from Five Year Average 
Wolf Population 
20.61 
(32.35)  # 
Central Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.919  No Observations 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  623.32 
(858.66)  # 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  -95.67 
(793.76)  # 
Normalized Five Year Average Wolf Population  -3.61 
(30.98)  # 
Normalized Difference from Five Year Average 
Wolf Population 
-75.87 
(99.28)  # 
Southwest Montana Wolf Variables 
Joint Effect, p-value  0.02  0.000 


















Other Model Variables 













Adjusted R-Squared  -0.02  0.10 
Standard Error of Regression  42.37  0.21 
Observations 518.00  318 
Notes: Each wolf variable is divided by the lagged number of permits issued. * Denotes 
significance at the 5% confidence level. **Denotes significance at the 1% confidence 
level.  # Denotes a lack of observations, allowing no estimation of the variable. 
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Northwest Montana Wolf Variables, p-value  0.00 # 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  0.43 
(25.61)  # 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  -1.22 
(7.42)  # 
Normalized Five Year Average Wolf Population  36.68** 
(4.11)  # 
Normalized Difference from Five Year Average Wolf Population 42.13** 
(4.54)  # 
Central Montana Wolf Variables, p-value 
0.01 
# 
Single District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  472.00** 
(174.54)  # 
Multiple District Wolf Initial Inhabitance Dummy  265.02* 
(102.61)  # 
Normalized Five Year Average Wolf Population  -74.72** 
(26.65)  # 
Normalized Difference from Five Year Average Wolf Population -113.53** 
(41.81)  # 
Southwest Montana Wolf Variables, p-value  0.001  0.000 
























A7 License Dummy  -0.04 
(0.41)  # 
Multiple District Dummy  0.47 
(0.31)  # 
















Archery Only Dummy  # 
-1.63 
(4.43) 
Brow-tined Bull Regulation Dummy  # 
-3.28 
(1.68)   31
Either-sex Partial Season Dummy  # 
-2.03 
(2.81) 
Youth Hunt Dummy  #  # 
Observations 104.000  76 
 
Notes: Each wolf variable is divided by the advertised quota. * Denotes significance at 
the 5% confidence level. **Denotes significance at the 1% confidence level.  # Denotes a 
lack of observations, allowing no estimation of the variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 